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COMMENT
TO SPEAK OR NOT TO SPEAK, THAT IS THE QUESTION: THE
IMPACT OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN PROSECUT-
ING THE DEATH OF DR. ERIC MILLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
While as captivating to the public as a John Grisham novel, the
investigation into Dr. Eric Miller's death should hold the attention of
lawyers in North Carolina as well.1 Amidst the adultery, poison, and
murder hangs the legal question of how far the attorney-client privi-
lege should extend after the client's death, if at all.2
Identified as a potential suspect in Miller's death, Derril Willard
contacted a local attorney, Richard Gammon. After meeting with Gam-
mon, Willard committed suicide. Those investigating Miller's death
believed that Willard's conversations with his attorney would yield a
much-needed break in the case, and therefore filed an order to compel
the disclosure of the client's comments involving Miller's death. Gam-
mon objected contending that the disclosure would violate attorney-
client privilege. The district court judge concluded that the informa-
tion should be disclosed, but Gammon appealed the decision and the
case is currently pending before the North Carolina Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court should not extend the common law privilege but,
in order to preserve justice, should narrowly prescribe an exception to
the privilege in this case.
* The author would like to thank Beth, Bill and Elizabeth Oden.
1. See Oren Dorell, Leads Scarce in Death, NEWS AND OBSERVER, (Raleigh), May 28,
2001; Andrea Weigl, DA Seeks Lawyer's Secrets in Miller Case, NEWS AND OBSERVER,
(Raleigh), Feb. 21, 2002; Matthew Eisly, State's Top Court Takes Case, NEWS AND
OBSERVER, (Raleigh), June 29, 2002; Andrea Weigl, High Court Delves into Privilege,
NEWS AND OBSERVER, (Raleigh), Oct. 16, 2002; 48 Hours: "Tracking a Killer-Virus or
Murder?" (CBS television broadcast, December 11, 2002).
2. See e.g., Poisoning Mystery Unfolds in N.C., http://www.detnow.com/news/
0102040702.html; DA Wants Lawyer to Release Information Linked to Eric Miller Case,
http://www.nbcl7.com/News/1401550/detail.htm
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II. CASE BACKGROUND
On November 15, 2000, Eric Miller went bowling with several of
his wife's co-workers. 3 While there, he drank part of a cup of beer
given to him by Derril Willard.4 After commenting that the beer tasted
funny, Dr. Miller began experiencing severe nausea, vomiting and
abdominal cramping later determined to be early symptoms of arsenic
poisoning.5 After a brief round of hospital visits, Dr. Miller died on
December 2, 2000.6 The cause of his "death was arsenic poisoning,
the manner of his death was homicide." 7
Derril Willard avoided any attempts by investigators to question
him, and Ann Miller, Eric Miller's wife, was only interviewed once.8
Following Dr. Miller's cremation at his wife's request, Mrs. Miller left
town and upon her return, she refused to be interviewed again.9 None-
theless, the investigation turned up proof of "an ongoing romantic rela-
tionship between Ann Miller and Derril Willard."' Subpoenaed
telephone records for both Ann Miller and Derril Willard revealed that
several calls were placed between the two of them, and the calls had a
"marked increase in . . . frequency and duration . . . immediately
before and after the poisoning."'" These calls were more suspicious
given the odd times at which they were made.12 Investigators also
recovered e-mail messages sent from Ann Miller to Derril Willard,
which indicated that the two were involved in a personal
relationship. 13
Derril Willard, apparently concerned about the pending investiga-
tion, retained the services of attorney Richard Gammon. Subse-
quently, Derril Willard committed suicide.14 When Yvette Willard was
interviewed after her husband's suicide, she admitted that Derril had
acknowledged a personal involvement with Ann Miller. 15 According to
Ms. Willard's affidavit, Derril told her that Gammon had informed
3. See In Re: The Investigation of the Death of Eric D. Miller, No. 02 SP0550, slip
op. at 60 (Wake Co., 2002).
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. Id. at 60.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 60-61.
10. Id. at 61.
11. Id. at 61, 62.
12. Id.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 62.
15. See id.
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him that he could potentially be charged with attempted murder. 16
Mrs. Willard, as executor for her husband's estate, waived any attor-
ney-client privilege that existed between Gammon and her husband,
and requested that Gammon disclose any information relevant to Eric
Miller's death that he learned from her husband, Derril. 17
The prosecution requested that the presiding senior resident supe-
rior court judge, Judge Stevens, conduct an in camera examination to
determine whether, in the interests of a proper administration of jus-
tice, the attorney-client privilege between Derril Willard and Gammon
had been or should be waived. 8 The Wake County District Attorney,
Colon Willoughby, submitted that the State had "reason to believe that
Richard T. Gammon [had] information relevant to the investigation
into the death of Eric D. Miller [that there were] no other means to
obtain this information," and that the information was necessary for a
"proper administration of justice."' 9 The district attorney's petition
relied on "the inherent power [of the courts] to assume jurisdiction
and issue necessary process in order to fulfill their assigned mission of
administering justice efficiently and promptly. 20
Answering a judicial order, Gammon challenged the district attor-
ney's petition, claiming that any information in his possession was
protected by the attorney-client privilege and that Yvette Willard did
not have the authority to waive her husband's attorney-client
privilege. 21
Determining that Yvette Willard's affidavit created "a reasonable
basis" to believe that Derril Willard had possessed information rele-
vant to Eric Miller's death, and that he had told Gammon this informa-
tion, Judge Stephens reasoned that the interest in solving a murder and
protecting the community outweighed Derril's privacy.22 Further,
"Yvette Willard, as spouse and as Executor of the estate of Derril Wil-
lard, has waived the marital privilege by the filing of her affidavit."23
Judge Stephens explained that,
there [was] no evidence before the court that Derril Willard reserved
only to himself the right to waive this privilege by specifically preclud-
ing, orally or in writing, the Executor of his estate from effecting this
16. See id. at 6.
17. See id. at 6.
18. See id. at 3.
19. Id. at 4.
20. Id. at 3 (quoting In re: Albemarle Mental Health Center, 42 N.C. App. 292, 296,
256 S.E.2d 818, 821 (1979)).
21. Id. at 21.
22. Id. at 66.
23. Id. at 67.
237
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waiver .. .[and] Derril Willard did not by his words or conduct pro-
hibit or preclude this waiver.2 4
Following the hearing, Judge Stephens ordered Gammon to sub-
mit to the court a sealed affidavit containing any relevant information
that he had received from his client.2 5 Judge Stephens's Order declared
that the information sought was "highly important, material and rele-
vant to an ongoing homicide investigation into the death of Eric
Miller" and did not appear to be available from any other source.2 6
Judge Stephens stated:
[tihe State's and public's interest in determining the identity of the per-
son or persons responsible for the death of Eric Miller outweigh the
public interest in protecting the attorney-client privilege, where the
estate of the deceased has waived the privilege and the estate has spe-
cifically requested that the information be disclosed by the attorney.
2 7
In explaining why the precedential effects of his decision would
be minimal, Judge Stephens emphasized that his Order would not
stretch the attorney-client privilege beyond its common law existence
because one who wishes to prevent waiver by his estate "may expressly
prohibit such [waiver] at any time prior to his death. 28
Gammon refused to comply with the order and Judge Stephens
determined that his ruling should be immediately reviewed by the
North Carolina Appellate Courts.2 9 Gammon's attorneys gave notice
of Appeal to the Court of Appeals of North Carolina.3" Subsequently,
District Attorney Willoughby and the attorneys for Gammon wrote a
joint petition to the North Carolina Court of Appeals asking the court
for discretionary review by the North Carolina Supreme Court prior to
determination by the Court of Appeals due to the first impression
nature of the case.3 ' The North Carolina Supreme Court granted
review and arguments were heard on Tuesday, October 15, 2002.32 In
the interests of justice, the North Carolina Supreme Court should
affirm Judge Stephens's decision requiring Gammon to reveal the sub-
stance of his conversation with Derril Willard.
24. Id. at 67.
25. Id. at 66.
26. Id. at 67.
27. Id. at 67-68.
28. Id. at 68.
29. See id. at 75.
30. See id. at 76.
31. See Joint Petition For Discretionary Review Prior To Determination By The
North Carolina Court of Appeals, In Re: The Investigation of the Death of Eric D.
Miller, xx NC xx, xx S.E.2d xx (N.C. 2003) (No. 303PA02).
32. See http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/sc/ca0210.htm.
[Vol. 25:235238
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III. NORTH CAROLINA'S ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
State law controls the North Carolina attorney-client privilege.33
North Carolina chose not to codify the attorney-client privilege and
therefore, common law governs the attorney-client privilege.3 4
"The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for
confidential communications known to the common law."' 35 Its pur-
pose is to "encourage full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the
observance of law and the administration of justice. ' 36 The attorney-cli-
ent privilege "rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know
all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the
professional mission is to be carried out."'37 The general rule is not
disputed-confidential communications between client and attorney
should not to be revealed at any time, as the privilege is that of the
client and not the attorney.3" "The [attorney-client] privilege exists
only to aid in the administration of justice, and when it is shown that
the interests of the administration of justice can only be frustrated by
the exercise of the privilege, the trial judge may require that the com-
munication be disclosed. 39
The North Carolina attorney-client privilege is not absolute.4 °
Rule 1.6(d)(3) of the North Carolina Revised Rules of Professional
Conduct allows an attorney to disclose confidential information
"when permitted under the Rules of Professional Conduct or required
by law or court order."4 1 Rule 1.6 also contains other exceptions to the
33. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 (2002). ("Except as otherwise required by the
Constitution of the United States, the privileges of a witness, person, government,
state, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with the law of
this State.")
34. See In Re: The Investigation of the Death of Eric D. Miller, No. 02 SP0550, slip
op. at 50 (Wake Co. 2002). The "common law" is the "'common law of England as of
the date of the signing of the Declaration of Independence."' Id. (quoting State v.
Vance, 328 N.C. 613, 617, 403 S.E.2d 495, 498 (1991)).
35. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
36. Evans v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 142 N.C. App. 18, 31, 541 S.E.2d 782,
790 (2001), cert. denied, 353 N.C. 371, 547 S.E.2d 810 (2001) (emphasis added).
37. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51
(1980)).
38. See Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. 280, 294 (1826).
39. Cohen v. Jenkintown, 238 Pa. Super 456, 464, 357 A.2d 689, 693-94 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1976).
40. See In Re: The Investigation of the Death of Eric D. Miller, No. 02 SP0550, slip
op. at 52 (Wake Co. 2002).
41. N.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.6(d)(3) (2001) (emphasis
added).
239
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attorney-client privilege. For example, when an attorney, by keeping
the attorney-client privilege intact, would be assisting his client in the
commission of a crime or other fraudulent practice, an exception to
the privilege can be made.42 RPC 206 following Rule 1.6 also reads,
"[a] lawyer may disclose the confidential information of a deceased
client to the personal representative of the client's estate .... 43
IV. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT
Arguing that the attorney-client privilege should be strictly con-
strued and only used for the purpose for which it was, created, the
district attorney contended that there was an "administration of jus-
tice" exception to the attorney-client privilege.44 The district attorney
also emphasized that there are exceptions to the general rule that the
privilege survives the death of the client.45
The United States Court of Appeals case, In re: Sealed Case dealt
with an investigation into the dismissal of White House Travel Office
employees.46 An attorney made notes of an initial interview with a
client shortly before the client committed suicide.47 The Government,
represented by the Office of Independent Counsel, wanted the notes
for use in a white-collar criminal investigation.48 Independent Coun-
sel contended that the attorney-client privilege should be qualified
because the client was dead. 49 The Court of Appeals noted that "hold-
ings actually manifesting the posthumous force of the privilege are rela-
tively rare."5" The Court of Appeals allowed Independent Counsel
access to the notes and emphasized that "there is little by way of judi-
cial holding that affirms the survival of the privilege after death, and
the framing of the posthumous privilege as belonging to the client's
42. See id. at cmt. 12.
43. See id. at RPC 206.
44. See In Re: The Investigation of the Death of Eric D. Miller, No. 02 SP0550, slip
op. at 37, 38 (Wake Co. 2002).
45. See id. An example of such an exception involves a deceased client's
communications with his attorney when people are fighting over the estate.
46. See In re: Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rev'd by Swidler & Berlin
v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998), remand to In re: Sealed Case, 172 F.3d 921
(D.C. Cir. 1998).
47. See id. at 231.
48. See id.
49. Id. (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §94 at 348: "the operation of the privilege
has in effect been nullified in the class of cases where it would most often be asserted
after death.")
50. Id. (emphasis added).
240 [Vol. 25:235
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estate or personal representative both suggests that the privilege may
terminate on the winding up of the estate ....
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Court of
Appeals decision in Swidler & Berlin v. United States.5 2 The Supreme
Court held that the attorney-client privilege protected the notes.5 3
However, even the majority opinion admitted that "the fear of disclo-
sure, and the consequent withholding of information from counsel,
may be reduced if disclosure is limited to posthumous disclosure in a
"154criminal context ....
In writing the dissenting opinion in Swidler, Justice O'Connor,
joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, agreed with the District Court of
Appeals in In re: Sealed Case.55 Justice O'Connor wrote, "a criminal
defendant's right to exculpatory evidence or a compelling law enforce-
ment need for information may, where the testimony is not available
from other sources, override a client's posthumous interest in confi-
dentiality. ' 56 Justice O'Connor continued that, "after death, the poten-
tial that disclosure will harm the client's interests has been greatly
diminished, and the risk that the client will be held criminally liable
has abated altogether. '5 7 Indeed, an "exception may ... be warranted in
the face of a compelling law enforcement need for the information. 5 8
In certain circumstances, Justice O'Connor explained, the attor-
ney-client privilege should not prevent disclosure of a deceased client's
communications. Justice O'Connor argued that information should be
disclosed despite the existence of the attorney-client privilege when 1)
the privilege is asserted in a criminal context, 2) the information can-
not be obtained in any other way and 3) the Court has conducted a
balancing test and determined that the interests of justice outweigh the
reason for the privilege.59 Justice O'Connor concluded that where:
[A] compelling law enforcement interest is at stake, the harm of pre-
cluding critical evidence that is unavailable by any other means out-
weighs the potential disincentive to forthright communication ...
51. Id.
52. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
53. See id. at 410.
54. Id. at 407.
55. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 411 (1998) (O'Connor, J.
dissenting).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 412.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 413-14.
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[Tihe cost of silence warrants a narrow exception to the rule that the
attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client.6 °
Even though the facts before the North Carolina Supreme Court
are similar to Swidler, North Carolina is not bound by the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision.6" The authority for the Swidler decision
rested on Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which makes clear that in this
case, state law controls. 6 2 District Attorney Willoughby also empha-
sized the U.S. Supreme Court's "disinclination to employ a balancing
test regarding evidentiary privileges"6 3 as evidenced in Jaffee v. Red-
mond, where the Court "'reject[ed] the balancing component of the
privilege implemented by [the Seventh Circuit] and a small number of
States . . ' "64 One of the states that the Supreme Court in Jaffee
referred to as implementing the balancing approach is North Caro-
lina. 65 Because state law governs the attorney-client privilege and
because North Carolina courts are willing to use the balancing rejected
by the U.S. Supreme Court, the North Carolina Supreme Court should
follow the U.S. Court of Appeals' decision in In re: Sealed Case and
Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Swidler, and weigh the inter-
est of justice against the importance of the privilege.6 6
V. GAMMON'S ARGUMENT
On the other side, Gammon's attorneys argued that 1) the attor-
ney-client privilege survives the client's death under North Carolina
law;6 7 2) that there is no basis for the "administration of justice" excep-
60. Id. at 416.
61. See In Re: The Investigation of the Death of Eric D. Miller No. 02 SP0550, slip
op. at 47 (Wake Co., 2002).
Because the majority in Swidler looked to the federal rules of evidence and
not to the Constitution or to an Act of Congress affecting the States, it does
not serve as binding precedent on the States . . . state courts may take a
different position. They may adopt the dissenting opinion or even the
opinion by the Court of Appeals.
62. "[I]n civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in
accordance with State law." FED. R. EvID. 501 (emphasis added).
63. In Re: The Investigation of the Death of Eric D. Miller No. 02 SP0550, slip op.
at 49 (Wake Co., 2002).
64. Id. (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996)).
65. See In Re: The Investigation of the Death of Eric D. Miller, No. 02 SP0550, slip
op. at 50 (Wake Co. 2002) (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996)).
66. Id.
67. See id. at 24 (citing In re Kemp's Will, 236 N.C. 680, 73 S.E.2d 906 (1953)). In
re Kemp's Will created a testator exception to the attorney-client privilege, allowing an
[Vol. 25:235
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tion sought by the state; and 3) that the attorney-client privilege has
not been waived, and the executor of Mr. Willard's estate cannot waive
the privilege.6" Gammon's attorneys focused on the fact that the State
was asking the North Carolina Supreme Court to do something that no
other court in the United States had ever done.69
Gammon's attorneys couched their argument in the decision
reached in Swidler & Berlin, discussed previously. 7° The majority
opinion in Swidler reads, "[kinowing that communications will remain
confidential even after death encourages the client to communicate
fully and frankly with counsel."'71 The Swidler Court continued,
"[c]lients may be concerned about reputation, civil liability, or possi-
ble harm to friends or family. Posthumous disclosures of such com-
munications may be as feared as disclosure during the client's
lifetime. "72 The majority in Swidler also determined that
[t]he loss of evidence admittedly caused by the privilege is justified in
part by the fact that... [w]ithout assurance of the privilege's posthu-
mous application, the client may very well not have made disclosures
to his attorneys at all, so the loss of evidence is more apparent than
real. In the case at hand, it seems quite plausible that [the client]
already contemplating suicide, may not have sought legal advice from
[the attorney] if he had not been assured the conversation was
privileged. 73
Admittedly, other state supreme courts have rejected the excep-
tion sought by District Attorney Willoughby in this case. The Colo-
rado Supreme Court in Wesp v. Everson, decided that an attorney who
had previously represented a dead client on related criminal charges
could not "testify about communications between the defendant and
his counsel regarding the criminal charges."' 74 The court in Wesp
could find "neither legal precedent nor authority that supports the
attorney to testify as to his deceased client's mental state at the time he executed his
will. Gammon's attorneys argued that because the North Carolina Supreme Court in
Kemp had to create an attorney-client privilege exception that this implies the
attorney-client privilege itself survives the death of the client.
68. See id. at 21, 25.
69. Id. at 21-22.
70. See id. at 25.
71. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 407.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 408.
74. In Re: The Investigation of the Death of Eric D. Miller No. 02 SP0550, slip op.
at 28 (Wake Co., 2002) (citing Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191 (Colo. 2001)).
243
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existence of any such [posthumous] exception to the rule of attorney-
client privilege.
75
Gammon's attorneys also suggested that the exception sought by
the State was contrary to the will of the North Carolina legislature.76
The North Carolina legislature has specifically addressed various areas
of privilege law, such as the doctor-patient privilege, the psychologist-
patient privilege, and the marital privilege. 77 The North Carolina leg-
islature has also created exceptions to those privileges.7 Gammon's
attorneys concluded that the legislature's failure to carve out the excep-
tion sought by the State, when such exceptions had been created for
other privileges, is proof that the intent of the legislature does not sup-
port creation of the exception sought by the State.79
Gammon's attorneys also moved to strike the affidavit of Yvette
Willard on the basis that it contained information protected by the
marital privilege.80 Without evidence that Derril Willard desired that
the information be disclosed upon his death, Gammon's attorneys
argued that North Carolina law prohibits one spouse waiving this priv-
ilege without first getting the other spouse's consent."'
Gammon's attorneys further rationalized that "no case in this
State, or any other, has permitted an executor of an estate to waive the
attorney-client privilege of the decedent to require disclosure of com-
munications between the decedent and his attorney regarding the
decedent's knowledge of or involvement in a criminal investigation. '" 2
Gammon's attorneys also argued that "neither North Carolina estate
law nor Derril Willard's will permits the executor of his estate to waive
the attorney-client privilege. 8s 3 Specifically, Mr. Willard's will only
empowered his executor to "'deal with any property, real or personal,
held in [his] estate or in any trust as freely as [he] might in the han-
dling of [his] own affairs, including the power to make any tax elec-
tions available to [his] estate or any trust created hereunder' and
further 'all of the powers set forth in North Carolina General Statute,
Section 32-27.' "84 Although N.C. Gen. Stat. §32-27 lists thirty-one
powers a fiduciary can exercise if granted the power, "[n]one of these
75. Id. at 29 (citing Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191 (Colo. 2001)).
76. See id. at 30.
77. See id. at 30.
78. Id. at 30.
79. Id. at 30-31.
80. Id. at 16.
81. See id. at 17, 19.
82. Id. at 31.
83. Id. at 32.
84. Id. at 32 (quoting Derril Willard's will).
[Vol. 25:235244
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thirty-one powers includes the ability to waive the attorney-client privi-
lege of the testator. "85 Furthermore, Gammon's attorneys argued that
nothing in Section 28A-13-3 of the General Statutes, which lists the
powers that an executor has in administering the estate, "permits an
executor to waive the attorney-client privilege of the decedent with
respect to communications the decedent had with his attorney relevant
to a criminal investigation." 6 Even if she was permitted to disclose
the information, for Yvette Willard to do so is contrary to the best
interests of her husband's estate and impermissible under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 28-13-3, according to Gammon's attorneys.8 7
Gammon's attorneys also focused on the importance of the attor-
ney-client privilege and its goal of impenetrable client confidence.
They emphasized that attorneys rely on Rule 1.6 of the Revised Rules
of Professional Conduct and the exceptions it specifically enumerates
and that this situation was not among those exceptions. 88 Gammon
explained that he did not advise Mr. Willard of a posthumous excep-
tion because there was no such exception under Rule 1.6 and forcing
him to reveal his client's confidences would be inequitable. 89
VI. GAMMON SHOULD BE COMPELLED To DISCLOSE
The North Carolina Supreme Court should affirm Judge Ste-
phens's decision to compel Gammon to disclose information regarding
Dr. Miller's death. Because the North Carolina legislature has not
codified the attorney-client privilege, the common law controls, and
judges must accordingly decide whether additional exceptions are
available in certain circumstances. It is upon this inherent power of
the court that the State based its original petition.90
Swidler & Berlin v. United States does not bind the North Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in this case because the attorney-client privi-
lege is governed by state law. 9' Furthermore, Swidler and the case at
hand are easily distinguishable. Here, the State attempted to discover
information to further the investigation of an already-established
crime. In Swidler, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the attorney-
client privilege as it related to the discovery of information leading to
85. Id. at 32; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §32-27 (2002).
86. Id. at 32.
87. See id. at 33.
88. Id. at 34.
89. See id. at 35.
90. See id. at 3.
91. See Swindler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
245
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establishing the existence of a crime.9 2 The North Carolina Supreme
Court should also consider that while Swidler dealt with white-collar
crime, the Eric Miller case is a murder investigation.93 It is obvious
that the need to establish the identity of an at-large killer is great. The
North Carolina Supreme Court should base its decision on the United
States Court of Appeals decision in In re: Sealed Case and Justice
O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Swidler and employ a balancing test
to determine the admissibility of the information Derril Willard pro-
vided Attorney Gammon.
The argument by Gammon's attorneys, that Willard's reliance on
the confidence of his communications with Gammon should preclude
disclosure, is unconvincing because no harm would befall Derril Wil-
lard's estate upon the disclosure of the information, nor is it certain
that his reputation would be tarnished. Eric Miller's parents, the fidu-
ciaries authorized to administer Eric Miller's estate, signed an Admin-
istrator's Release that waived any action Eric's estate might have
against Derril Willard's estate or his heirs. 94 Such a release ensures
that divulging the attorney-client privilege in this case would not cause
harm to Willard's estate.
Although Willard's reputation is a factor, the North Carolina
Supreme Court should not preclude waiver because of the interest in
protecting Derril Willard's reputation, as that would be pure specula-
tion. Specifically, we do not know what information Gammon gleaned
from his conversations with Derril Willard. The media has already
exposed Derril Willard to the public and the information sought for
disclosure by the State could very well place him in a better light, espe-
cially if the information sought exonerates him from all guilt.
Yvette Willard is not acting contrary to the interests of her hus-
band's estate or memory. She is merely attempting to discover the
truth surrounding her husband's death, a truth to which she is enti-
tled. Gammon's attorneys argued that Yvette Willard's affidavit be
struck because it is covered by the confidential provisions of the mari-
tal privilege. However, two North Carolina cases imply that Yvette Wil-
lard should be allowed to act contrary to the marital privilege she
shared with Mr. Willard. In State v. Freeman, the "defendant invoked
the rule of spousal disqualification ... to exclude evidence of criminal
acts committed in a public place and in the presence of a third per-
92. See Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 407.
93. See In Re: The Investigation of the Death of Eric D. Miller No. 02 SP0550, slip
op. at 48 (Wake Co., 2002).
94. See id. at 64, 65.
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son."95 Freeman reiterates the court's inherent power relied upon by
the district attorney, specifically that; "[a]bsent a legislative declara-
tion, this Court possesses the authority to alter judicially created com-
mon law when it deems it necessary in light of experience and
reason."96 The court in Freeman continued, "[wihen we consider the
common law rule preventing spouses from testifying against each
other as to any matter at issue in a criminal proceeding in light of its
purpose to promote marital harmony, we find that the rule sweeps
more broadly than its justification. ' 97 The court explained that "the
public interest in ascertaining the truth outweighs any policy to pro-
mote marital harmony. '"98
State v. Holmes, another North Carolina Supreme Court case, con-
sidered whether a "witness spouse [could] testify at trial as to confi-
dential communications made to her by defendant spouse over
defendant spouse's objection and assertion of privilege."99 Although
the Court decided that the spouse could not testify, it emphasized the
objection of the defendant spouse in its decision.' 00 However, unlike
in State v. Holmes, there is no evidence that Derril Willard would
object to the disclosure.
There is further evidence that Yvette Willard should be allowed to
waive her husband's attorney-client privilege. For instance, one of the
powers expressly enumerated within N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28-13-3 is the
right of a representative or fiduciary of the decedent to "compromise,
adjust, arbitrate, sue on or defend, abandon, or otherwise deal with
and settle claims in favor of or against the estate."'10 ' Furthermore, the
New York court in In re: Estate of Colby decided that, "the right to
waive the [attorney-client] privilege can survive the client . . . [slince
the client could have waived the privilege to protect himself or to pro-
mote his interest," and found it "reasonable to conclude that, after his
95. State v. Freeman, 302 N.C. 591, 595, 276 S.E.2d 450, 453 (1981).
96. Id. at 594, 276 S.E.2d at 452.
97. Id. at 595, 276 S.E.2d at 453.
98. Id. at 595-96, 276 S.E.2d at 453- 54.
99. State v. Holmes, 330 N.C. 826, 827, 412 S.E.2d 660, 660 (1992).
100. See id. at 828, 412 S.E.2d at 660.
101. See In Re: The Investigation of the Death of Eric D. Miller No. 02 SP0550, slip
op. at 32 (Wake Co. 2002). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-13-3(a)(15) (2002); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 32-27(23) (2002) (one of the powers incorporated by reference to a
fiduciary is the right to "compromise, adjust, arbitrate, sue on or defend, abandon, or
otherwise deal with and settle claims in favor of or against the estate or trust as the
fiduciary shall deem advisable, and the fiduciary's decision shall be conclusive
between the fiduciary and the.. person against or for whom the claim is asserted...")
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death, [a] personal representative stands in his shoes for the same
purposes."1 °2
The current attorney-client privilege is not absolute. "[P]rivilege
has in effect been nullified in the class of cases where it would most
often be asserted after death, namely, cases involving the validity or
interpretation of a will, or other dispute between parties claiming by
succession from the testator at his death."10 3 Furthermore, there is
such a thing as "temporary confidentiality" as is the case with discus-
sions relevant to the creation of a client's will, it exists during his life-
time but does not necessarily extend past the client's death.'0 4
Similarly,
[iut would only be a short step forward for the courts to apply here the
notion that the [attorney-client] privilege is 'personal' to the client, and
to hold that in all cases death terminates the privilege. This could not
to any substantial degree lessen the encouragement for free disclosure
which is the purpose of the privilege.10 5
Public policy demands that Gammon be forced to speak. There is
the possibility that by not waiving the attorney-client privilege in this
case, that an innocent person will be charged with the crime of the
murder of Eric Miller. Therefore, the North Carolina Supreme Court
could affirm Judge Stephens's decision, but narrowly tailor its deci-
sion to the facts at hand. For example, the State suggests certain pre-
requisites that would help "channel the precedential effect" of the
Court's decision in future cases including: 1) the client must be
deceased; 2) the exception must be limited to cases involving a murder
charge; 3) the lower court must have had a reasonable basis for believ-
ing that the deceased client divulged relevant information concerning
the crime to his attorney; 4) the information must not be available
from any other source; 5) the information must be highly important to
the investigation; and 6) the representative of the deceased client must
have waived the attorney-client privilege.10 6 The likelihood of these
conditions all repeating themselves is slight, and even if met again,
nothing will force the trial judge's hand in admitting the evidence
102. In re: Estate of Colby, 723 N.Y.S.2d 631, 634 (N.Y. Sur. 2001).
103. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 94, at 348. (4th ed., 1992).
104. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 94, at 378 (5th ed. 1999).
105. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 94, at 349-350 (4th ed. 1992).
106. Brief For The State at 73-74, In Re: The Investigation of the Death of Eric D.
Miller, xx NC xx, xx S.E.2d xx (N.C. 2003) (No. 303PA02).
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because the judge would still need to utilize a balancing test, as In re:
Sealed Case and Justice O'Connor's dissent in Swidler suggests.1 0 7
Finally, the waiver of the attorney-client privilege in this narrow
fact pattern will not substantially affect the trust clients are willing to
place in their attorneys. The attorneys for Gammon admit that excep-
tions do already exist to the privilege and cannot point to any evidence
that this effects a client's trust.' 0 8 Attorneys will not feel obligated to
mention the exception sought in this unique case for the same reason
that they do not warn their clients of other possible, yet rare
exceptions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether the attorney-client privilege is waived in
this case, Eric Miller's death will affect future North Carolina deci-
sions. If the North Carolina Supreme Court affirms Judge Stephens's
ruling, the decision should be narrowly tailored to fit the facts of this
unusual case. However, there seems to be little to prevent ambitious
prosecutors from trying to push the envelope and expand the excep-
tion. Waiver should only be considered in cases involving a murder in
which the killer has not been identified. North Carolina courts, how-
ever, may consider expanding this exception to include rape, child
abuse, or other acts that society abhors. Regardless, the court should
be wary of opening the door to any more waivers than is necessary to
properly administer justice. In the alternative, if the North Carolina
Supreme Court chooses to reverse Judge Stephens's decision, attacks
on the North Carolina attorney-client privilege will continue and a
murder will go unsolved.
William A. Oden, III
107. See In re: Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rev'd by Swidler & Berlin
v. U.S., 524 U.S. 399 (1998), remand to In re: Sealed Case, 172 F.3d 921 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
108. See In Re: The Investigation of the Death of Eric D. Miller No. 02 SP0550, slip
op. at 30 (Wake Co.,2002).
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